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FORtIGN MILITARY INTERVENTION AND ·CHANGES IN UNITED STATES BUSINESS A. CTIVITY*
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ABSTRACT
l'Neo-Leninist" and elitist theories of business influence on·and benefits from U.S. military action (1948-67) are investigated .. Hypotheses posit
significant increases of U.S. trade, acqufsition of "strategic" raw materials,
overseas i.nvestment, defense industry profits and stock exchange performance
during and after military interventions abroad. There was no overall correlation between intervention and ·over.seas business benefits, .although. in certain cases access to African raw materials increased as did trade with Asia
and the Middle East and capital flows to Asia.

Scope and duration of inter.;,

vention made little. difference' in these findings. While industries' profitability peaked during and after the Vietnam war, profit margins did not.
generally depend on mi-litary action, although clusters of interven.tions
c6incidea with i~proved defense stock performance.

*Data utilized in this study were made available, in part, by the·InterUniversity Consortium foi Political and Social Research. Some data ~ere
originally ccillected by Richard Cady and William Prince. Neithe~ the
original collectors of the data nor the consortium bears any responsibility
for the analysi~ or the interpretations presented here .. The authors are also
extremely grateful to Dennis Cropper, John ·Klosterman, Kenneth Rudd, and.
Mark Seals \vho assisted in data gathering. Helpful advi_ce was provided by
our collea9ues Sioma Kagan and Emilio Pagoulatos, and Rep. James Symington .
of Missouri kindly facilitated data acquisition. The Center for International ·studies, University of Missouri-St. Louis generously supported the
research, and Veronica Le Page and Joy Gerstein efficiently prepared the
.
manusctipt. Th~ authors alone remain responsible for contents and conclusions~
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.. INTRODUCTION
The national debate in the Uni~ed States over Vietnam spurred considerable academic research into the influence of. U.S. business on gov~rnment
policy in general and foreign policy in particular .. Some researchers have
asserted that the military sector is the most profitable and influential
part of _the American capitalist system, and that the machinations of defense
industrialists have militarized the American society, polity, and economy •.
Militarization may lead to U.S; military action and otherforrris of inter-···
vention abroad as well.

However, studies showing ex9rbitant profits of

defense contractors, generally -increasing defense costs, and the government influence of corporate representatives do not necessarily show that
Washington's foreign policies are ccmtrolled by or designed to benefit
business interests.

It is necessary to look for evidence of such foreign

policy control and benefits.

In particular, thi~ study will focus on the

possible benefits accruing to U.S.- business from U.S. foreign military interventions ..
· Two related but somewhat distinct approaches to the businesi-forejgn
policy linkage have emerged in the literature:
the elitist.

the 11 neo-Leninist 11 , and

~.

These are certainly not contradictory approaches, but they

emphasize different sources of foreign military policy.

11

Neo-Leninists 11

argue that capitalists' needs for_overseasmarkets, profits, and workers
strongly condition government foreign policy decisions, particularly concerning the use of governmental force _to secure these needs.

(See refer-

ences in Russett and Hanson, 1975, C~. 2; as well as Kolko, 1969; Magdoff,
1969; and Kramer and Bauer, 1972.) · Economic exploitation of the "Third

World" is seen as the root of U.S. interventionism.

Elite theorists, on

2

the other hand, would attribute u~s~ military activity in part to.the size
and influence of the military industrial establishment seeking to protect
interests inside the u~s. Some elite theorists dwell on 11 military~indus;..
trial complexes, while others speak of "power elites." The military-

,'

11

industrial complex notion normally entails a web of economic benefits from
and societal dependence on military spending and a militarization of societ,r.
.

Power elite theorists emphasize the influence
of a closed and relatively
.
small socio~economic elite shuffling.between points of power in government
and business.

(Se~ Williams and Tarr~ 1974~ ·192-95; Rosen, 1973; Russett,

1970; Mills, 1956; Barnet, 1973; and Melman, 1970,)
Whatev·er the particular emphasis, the elite approaches reflect a general
belief in the close relations of ·business, military, and government elites,
as well as a belief in the strong influence of·the fonner two on the latter
_elite arid the strong dependence of th·e U.S. economy on military spending.
Employment,· profit levels, and investment in enterprises inside the U.S.

E

depend on the large chunk of money dispensed each year by the Pentagon.
Theorists then speculate that the weapons produced are likely to be used in
foreign combat, if for no other reason than to legitimize future military
production.

Thus the impetus for interventionism comei from,the influence

of specific domestic elites, and resulting militarization of society andi
public spending, rather than from capitalism's exploitation abroad.
While both neo-Leninists and elite theorists imply that business
11

11

interests wi 11 both encourage and benefit from military action abroad,
there are good arguments to the contrary.

Economic and bureaucratic bene-

fits of military spending can accumulate whether or not the resultant
. weapons and forces.are used.

Also, Lenin's theory of imperialistic wars

3

notwithstanding, foreign investments can be jeopardized as well as secured
.by military c_ombat and._its dislocations. T~us~ there are reasons td doubt
as well as suspect a correlation of·U~s. interventions and benefits for

i

U.S. business.
In testing predictions and descriptions of U.S. militarism, we would
expect:

(1) concrete economic benefits for U.S. business abroad during

and·after·u.s~ interventions if the rieo~Lentnists are correct; and (2)
.

.

.

.

.-

concrete benefits for U.S. defense industries at horrie if elite theorists
are correct.

More specifically, average U.S. bu~iness involvement in

countries uridergoing intervention should be greater than in similar
countries not undergoing intervention; and average involvement should be
gre~ter after intervention than before.

ihe ·same woul~ be true of bus-

ine·ss benefits inside the U.S.- If no correlation is fol.ind between interventions and busine~s benefits, neo-Leninist or elite·th~ories would not
be disproved, but there would be grounds to question the direct influence1
of economii interests on specific strategic decisions in Washington!

Con-

ceivably capitalists and ·industrialists-might pressure for foreign policies
from which they do not benefit, but they would hardly·be-expected to do so
for long.
Obviou_sly, when the government of a large and commercially active
· country such as the U.S. pursues foreign policy "national interests,"
economic interests are bound to be among those pursued.

Thus -there is

likely to be a least an indi-rect l inka_ge between foreign pol icy and bus..:
iness interests.

Further, it is difffcult to solve the chicken and egg".
11

problem concerning business-government relations and determine whether
business manipulates foreign policy, or merely coincidentally benefits
from governmental elites' decisions, or both.

As Bernard Morris notes,·

4
II

.it is not capitalism per se that drives the United States into aggres-

sive actions, it is rather that aggressive action stems from Ameri.can power,
which does happen to have a capitalist base.

11

(1973:37}

Rather than searching for first causes of interventionist U.S. military
policy, at this point it seems best to _detail the effects of such policy on
U.S. business activity both at home and abroad. · In this way it will be
possible to determine whether .and under what circumstances business b.enefits from government's foreign interventions.
PRIOR STUDIES
There have been relativeiy few attempts to relate business activity-as opposed t6 business opinion~-to foreign intervention. There is some
evidence that significant U.S. economic interests were present in certain
countries which experienced U.S. military interventions after 1945, especially in Latin America and Africa; however, polit1cal and strategic mflitary
objectives seemed to predominate in the majority ·of interventions~

(See

Pea~son, 1976 and 1974; and Peterien, 1976.)
,Elitist theory predictions have been examined in some detail

by

Li eberson ( 1971) and Stev·enson (1973; see al so, Russett, 1970, Ch. l; and

· Melman, 1970), w1th somewhat conflicting findings.
have sh·own that,

11

•••

A number of researchers

defense industries were unusually profitable in the

late 1950's but after 1961 the pattern was reversed.

11

However, Stevenson

(1E73: 249~252} concludes that the~e industries remained at least a~

profitable as other industries in the 1960 s, and in most cas_es more· pro1

fitable.

However, Stevenson doe~ not talculate ~he variation in .such pro-

fitability which might

oe

associated with U.S. military action abroad.

5

Utilhing content analysis and· elite interviews, Russett and Hanson
.

.

.

tested competing hypotheses about whether busines~ .teade·rs favor foreign.
.

military actfon.

.

Generally they found that business elites strongly favored

all forms of intervention, though not as strongly as military elites
(Russett ~nd Hanson, 1975,.th. 2 and 6, and p. 188). Also, there was no
evidence that· business leaders were "more likely to advocate-military intervention than . . . members of the public at large," although executives surveyed were more hawkish than other civilian elites (p. 197; Ch. 3). · Exec, utives from corporations "with substantial foreign sales or investments"
or expectations of. sue~ activites were more favorable toward U.S. govern-·
ment action to protect U.S. business interests abroad than oth~r executives,
and favored promotion of Third World governments receptive to foreign investment and free enterprise.

However, defense industry executives were

not especially hawkish on fo·reign policy issues, althoughth_ey were more
favorable toward "mil_itary preparedness" than other business leaders _(pp.
247-48).
While answering some questions about relations of business and government elites, Russett and Hanson do not consider business activity as distinct from opinion--except in Dow-Jones totals.

Odell (1974: 148-49)

associates various forms of business activity abroad with U.S. foreign
military assistance, and finds moderate to strongcorrelations between
assistance to and raw materic!,ls extracted from countries, and between
assistance and foreign investment and trade~

Regarding direct military

intervention (measured through the somewhat inaccurate World Handbook . ..!l.
intervention data set), Odell·finds little or no relation to U.S. economic·
interests (152-53).

Among the least politically stable poor countries,·

trade with U.S. does correlate with iritervention likelihood, but

... ,

~,

.-

..

.

6

instability seems a stronger factor than economic interest (p. 153).

A

'

I

I

•

generally weak to moderate .relation is found between U.S .. region~l economic
interests. and intervention, lending sl.i_ght support to the corollary of neo- ·.

I

Leninist theory that even though u~s.·business activity in a single country
is negligible, ·intervention may be.designed to assure continued ac.tivity in
l -

the larger region.
Rosen (1974) finds some support ·for

11

neo-Leninist 11 or economic interest

theories of U.S. foreign pol fey~ showing that American foreign assistan~e
. programs were contingent, in four of five cases su·rveyed, on the recipient
regime's friend~iness to U.S.- b~siness interesis.
.

.

·-

.

.

Of tourse, three of the
:

.

.

five cases were in Latin America, where·u.s. business seems especially in-,
fluential, a~d Roseri ~id ~ot select cases at random.

'
Nor was there
any

examination of the effect of direct or covert U.S. -intervention or other·_
possible contaminating variables.
While Rosen dealt with business-governmen.t, foreign pol icy

i inkages

~cross time within certain foreign·states, there is .little information in·
i
.

f

.

c,urrent research on the patterns whereby business activity either increas~s
or d~creases with intervention.

Regardless of the complicat~d initial

motivations in- Washington, it is necessary to know whether the effect of
intervention is to increase U.S. business involvement· in affected countries -

!

or the volume of defense-related business. at home ..
DATA ANALYSIS AND DESIGN
Increases or decreases in U.S. business activity wilJbe related to
_U.S. military intervention by comparing business activity before and after
.

i_

.

.

.·

.

.

foreign incid~nts or trises that~ould have or ~id,result in intervention.
For example, if, in a given year during·the.period for whic~ inter~erition'
I
I

•

~ •

I

1
data have been collected, i.e., 1948.-6?,· three crises resulted in

u.s:

in-

tervention and five did not, t~e average increase (or decrease) of business
activity from two years before to two years after the three crises entail. ing intervention wil 1 be compared :to· the average increase (or decrease)- for
the five·U.S. abstentions.

In this way we can determine whether interven-

tion or abstention led to greater business activity.
Military intervention is defined as the dispatch of

·u~s.

troops to a

foreign state, or action by troops already sta.tioned. abroad, in the con-

-

..

text of some political controversy involving that it~te~ Maneuvers, shows
of force, and covert or accidental involvement are excluded from this study
if they did riot entail military encroachment a.cross borders or combat re-.

lated to the controversy.

An annotated list of 26 such interventions, as

well as a list of non~ihterventions, is provided in the appendix.

Inter-

vention data were collected from The New York Times and regional chronolo~ies and news sources, as well as from ~oaks and scholarly studies of
foreign conflicts.

Cases of nonintervention were derived from Cady ,and•
11

11

Prince's (1974) data on U.S., USSR~ and. PRC involvement in international
.

.

conflicts.

These were cases _of foreign disputes which presumably could,

. have engaged U.S. interest and intervention but did not.

A country the

size of the U.S. is ·never totally L!riinvolved in such disputes, but "non~
interventions" mean that there was no evident commitment of military per-.·
sonnel or equipment, overt or covert, in the context of the dispute. 1
Business activity indicators include both measures of foreign business
operations of U.S. firms and domestic profitability arid stock market per;.
formance of defense vs. non-defense oriented firms or divisions of. firms.
Overseas business activity includes:

(1) a~quisition of natural resources

8
..

designated· ''strategic materials" by the U. S; executive .branch;

(2) imports

from and exports to foreign states;· and (3) private direct in~estment in o'r
net capital flows to foreign states. Sources of business activity_ data
are specified in the ap-pendix. 2 All· overseas business indicators are con. verted to percentages of GNP or of_ total economic activity to eliminate
effects of inflation on dollar ~alues.
'

.

It is not enough to relate general business activity to intervention
since certain types of businesses may benefit more than others from military activity.

N~tur~lly, defense
industries might be expected to bene-!
.
.

.

fit, along with industries dependent on certain strategic natural resources
avail~ble averse~~ and important to the Pentagon .. ~o tap the special in-~
terest of c~rtain defense ori~nted or specialized indu~tties we have:
(1) included data on domestic profitability and stock performance of such
.·-

industries;

(2) calculated the amount of-militarily- strategic (defined by

Pentagon) natural resources used. in defense pr6duction and imported from : ·
foreign countries which may or may ~ot have experienced U.S. interVentions. 3
Analyses will be -~un for cases -of intervention and nonintervention
occurring in the same year.

Business activity will be measured for the

two years prior to and the two years following such cases.

It is assumed,.

that across such'a five year period, at least the initial effects of the
intervention on business· activity will be evident.

Obviously the effects

may come _later than two years· after i_ntervent_ion, put_ confounding factors
influencing business activi.ty would also multiply during such longer time
periods.

Even in the two year span we can only infer that interventions

might be related to business gains or losses, since many extraneous factors
r

influence business performance.

But the changing effects· of the extraneous

factors are minimized, while the probability of finding at least some

.

I .

9

traces of business-intervention symbiosis is maximized by selecting this

1·

time-frame.
Findings--Neo-Leninist Theory.· In considering .whether.the neo-Lenfoist
theories are .supported by the data we wil 1 be in effect seeking the answers·
to two questions:

(1) ·to what extent do existing economic interests abroad
,

,

predict whether or not the·u.s. will intervene militarily if a conflict a-..
rises; and (2) to what extent does intervent,ionincrease U.S. business with
and economic penetration of the target country, compared to penetration of
countries not experiencing U.S. intervention.
Averaging across the 26cases of U.S. military intervention and the 97
cases of ~bstention, and allowing

for

missing data on some indicators

{Table 1), the U.S. seemed Somewhat more likely to intervene instates w.ith
(Tabl~ i about -her~)
'

,

significant trade ties to American bus_iness. than in less important economic
markets.

Ignoring region for the moment, states undergoing U.S. inter~en-

tions averaged 4.0% more imports from the U.S. as a percentage of their
total imports and 3.3% more exports to the U.S. as a p~rc~ntage of their•
total exports two years. prior to ihter:vention than states. not experiencing
intervention.

Th~s, the U.S. tended to intervene in states already com-

paratively dependent on U.S. trade.
,

,

1

However, the ·same tendenc.ies ·are not ·
,

present for i.ndicators of strategic material suppl_y and of U.S. dependence
6n trade with foreign states.

Thus, nee-Leninist predictions are only

partly supported with evidence of prior business interest in intervention
targets.
However, neo-Leninists would probably also.predict greater increases
of U.S. business· involvement in targets than in non-targets of interven.:
tion.

Many analysts have noted that while the U.S. may not have had great-

'
TABLE 1. AVERAGE PERCENTAGE OF U.S. BUSINESS ACTIVITY IN STATES UNDERGOING
CONFLICT TWO YEARS PRIOR TO AND TWO YEARS AFTER U.S. INTERVENTION
OR NON~INTERVENTION
~-

•~
Strategit Mat~rials
All regions
Latin America
Africa
Middle East
Asia
Europe

Non-Intervention
Intervention
. Avg. 2 years Avg. 2 years Avg. 2 years Avg. 2 years
before
After
before
After
,N
%
%
N
N
%
N
%
96
-11.6 11.4
18
24.8 26.2
·. 29 .
l .8
l. 9
19
4.2 4 .1
25
19.9 18.6 ·
5
7.6 5.2

Imports from U.S. as%
Imports from World
· All regions
Latin America.
Africa
Middle East
Asia
Europe

96
18
29
19
25
5

25
3
42·
15

59
13
14
13
15
4

17.

l

7 .4 . ll .8
9 .1
l O.1
21.3 29.-4
0.0 · 0.0
4.8
9.8
0.0
0.0

25
3
4
2
15

23.0
41.6
13 ..7
15.7
26.0

.17'
2
5
2
.8
0

l

of
59
13
14 .
13
15
4

Exports to U.S. as% of
Exports to World
All regions
59
Latin America
13
Africa
13
Middle East
13
Asia
16
Europe
4
Imports from U.S. as%
· of Total u.s~ Exports
Ali regions
77
Latin America
18
Africa
17
Middle East
16
Asia
21
Europe ·
5
Exports to U.S. as%
of Total U.S Imports
All regions
75
Latin America
18
Africa
15
Middle East
15
22
Asi~.
·Europe
5

21. 7
42.3
10 .1
19.4
18. l
15.8

20.5
40 .1
9.3
17.7
17.9
14.6

15.0
28:4.
11.0
9.2
13.3
10.2

16.6 . 59
29.0
13
16.5
13
10.0. · 13
13. 9 · · . 16
9.0
"4

.0.82 - 0.80
1. 32 l. 14
0. 15 o. 15
0.36 0.29
0.89 ·0.97
2.51 2.64
0.86
1.80
0.16
0 .15
1.11
0.60

0.85
1 ..72
0. 23_
0. 14
1.07
0.80

2
5
2
8
0

25.7
62.6
19.3
ll.6
23.9

i 8 · 18~ 3
2
5
2
9
0

77
18
17
16
21
5

24
2
5
2
14

. 75
18
1.5
15:
22
5

24
2·
5
2
14

1

'.

1

19.6 18
72.9 69.3 . 2 ,.
10.2
8.9
5
3. 4 . 2
4.5
13.8 · 18.1
9
0

0.78
1 •. 56
0.20
0; 12 ·
1.01
0.00

0.56

o. 10 ·
o.12 ..

24
2

5· .

0.16
2
0.79 14
0.00. 1

0.56 0.36 24
.2.20 1 ..47
2
0.16 0. 11
5
0.04 . 0.01 · 2
0.50 0.36 14
0.00' 0.00
1

I•

I

I

!

.,
~

·.

~
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business interest in Vietnam prior to military involvement there, the stak!es
for U.S. oil companies and other firms had mu~hroomed by war's end.

There

is only limited support for this· view when all. interventions are considered.
Interventions seem to have considerably increased the supply o~ strategic•
~aterials to the U.S., but hardly affected foreign states' trade with the
U.S.
While thete is an overall tendehcy for Washington to intervene in
countries with significant American trade ties, there are. important regio~al
differences.

In Latin America, and, to a lesser extent, Africa and Asia it

appears that the U.S. is likely to intervene in conflicts involving important trade partners.

This does.not seem to be the case i~ the Middle East,

whefe U.S. interventions were in oil-poor states, although perhaps designed
to protect U.S. interests in·oil-rich states. Access to strategic Africari
raw materials (such as cobalt and manganese} may have been an important
consideration for U.S. interventions in Gabon and Congo-Kinshasa, althou~h ·
competition with the USSR may have been a factor as well.
tnterventions seemed to increase U.S. access .to strategic materials
and trade in Asia across the five-year time periods, and further increased
supplies of African strategic materials and exports to the Middle East.
However, these are not very consistent indications of economic ·benefits
when we consider increased strategic materials from and trade with Latin
American, as well as increased imports from African states not undergoing
U.S. intervention.

Generally, interventions _seemed to have l_ittle effect

on trade with Latin America, although there was a large increase of U.S.
imports from the Dominican Republic after 1965 •. Thus, _perhaps with the '.
exception of Southeast Asia, it is not much help to know whether Amerfcan
troops have intervened in a country if one is trying tp predict whether

, l
I;

11

economic ti es to the U; S. wi 11 increase after confi i cts.
.

Correlational analysis (product-moment) was conducted to assess ,the
impact

;

of certain

contextual variables -- region, s.ize andi'duration of u.s:,

tr~mp commitment -- as well as the act of intervention itself (a. dichot~
•

..,,

I
I

•

.j

1

,,

C

omcius variable) on business indicators. · Certafo working hypotheses apply ..
to this analysis;

'

(1) in regions subje·ct to rather continuous U.S. econom.,

ic presence, such as Latin Aineric.a, there might be gr:eater increases of

~I

]

,..
i

I

I·

I

i

' business activity. after interventions than in other regions ·(see Petersen,
1

!

1976); and (2) the longer the duration and greater the extent of interven0

.1

t~on, the more probable the subsequeni dependence of target on u;s. goods,,
and services. ·

i

!I
I

There was little or no correlation between intervention ana U.S. bus-.
.

tness involvements during and after foreign
crises. · The best predictor
.
.

.

of the leVel of

U.S.

.

.

I

I

,.i

.

I

business involvement after· crisis was the level of

involvement two years before the crisis.

Between 75 _and·9Q percent of the

!

•
'

I

variance in ·indicators of U.S;. trade and acquisition of strategic materials.
.

I

,

.

after crises was accounted for by pre.,."crises totals on these same indica~·
tors.4

The impact of U.S. military interv~ntion on subsequent business

I
ranged
between zero an9 four percent of variance explained, and.this was_.·

true for each region in the world.
1

Hence there is no support for the fi rs,t

hypothesis.
Likewise, there seems little ·consistent tendency f'Qr large scale
- (high combat troop commitment) or prolonged interventions to produce in- ·
.creased overseas business. involvement (hypothesis 2).

There were few

cases with data for intervention scope .and duration, and hence statisti.

~

.

cally reliable correlational analjsis was pre~luded.

Increased access to

. strategic raw materials followed interventions with no U.S. combat·

!

I
II

12
{eg., providing logistical .support for other states' troops) or, in one
case, involvement of less.than 250 U;S. troop~.

The only benefits derived

from la.rge s·cale (1000 troops or more) ·intervention w~re. sl.ight increases
in exports to the targets (averagi.ng about one percentage point).

Inter-

ventions of long duration (more than six months) produced apprec.iable
(nine percentage points) average increases in

u~s.

••

imports from the targets

· as a -percent of targets• world exports, and slight increases in targets' imports as a percent of U.S. world exports.

The only benefits of increased

strategic.materials followed interventions of relatively short duration
(an increase of 20 percentage points for medium term interventions of one
week to six months).

All other indicators declined after intervention re-

·gardless of scope or duration.

Thus, assertions that large scale inter-

ventions, ·such. as Vietnam, lead t~ great business dividends are called into
question.
Neo-Leninists assert that

u.s:

capitalists rely on direct investment

abroad to maintain and increase exploi~ati6n of the Third World.

HoweverJ

as with most of the trade indicators, the relations of foreign investment
and intervention also seem weak (Table 2a), although U.S. investment data
(Table 2 about here)
are quite sketchy for the Third World, and subject to what the Commerce
Department calls significant statistical error" due to incomplete samples..
11

Generally, measuring the difference between investment two years before
and two years after intervention and abstention, there were several inter.:.
.

.

.

vention years, ~specially in the 1960's, after which average investment
growth was greater for abstentions than for interventions:

U.S. invest-

ments in Cuba increase~ sharply after the intervention.there in 1958, but
· dropped sharply after the Castro revolution developed; . indeed, frequent.

TABLE 2.
.;.

AVERAGE CHANGES IN. INVESTMENT AND CAPITAL FLOW iWITH 11 FRIENDL yul ·
U.S. MILITARY INTERVENTION OR WITH ABSTENTION

Table 2a-- U~S. -~rivate Direct Foreign Investments (Millions of Dollars In. crease or Decrease)

-J-.

51 3

Year
Non-Inter'.'"
ventions 42.l
N=9
Interventions

76
N=l

--

55

584

61

45.8 34.6
N=6 N=7

47.8 · 28
N=6 N=3

89.l 61.7 32
N=9 N=6. N=4

40
N=l

53.5
N=2

26.5
· N=2

24

N=l

Table 2b-- U.S. Private Capital Flows (Absolute Differences in Millions of
Dollars, Regardless of Whether Increase or Decrease, Between 1950
and 1957 or Between 1957 and 1966) 1
Year

48

Non-Interventions
Interventions

50

51

161.2
N=5

8.7
N=9

•5
18
N=2 . N=l

· 111 Friendly 11

· 55.

58

61

62

64

65

67

2.8 -130.8 1· -100.9 -.4 5.7
N=9
N=6 N=3
N=8 N=lO N=7
l
N=l

"'.'38 l
N=2 N=l

3.5 -.5
N=2 N~4

-13
N=l

-1
N=l

interventions were those in which the U.S. either intervened
to support the·target gover~ment or to oppose rebels .. Only such
11 friendly interventions are analyzed h.ere.
2Difference between 1943 and 1950
3Difference between 1950 and 1953 ·
4Difference between 19~7 and 1959
"
5Difference between 1960 and 1963
6Difference between 1963 and lg66
7Negati~e numbers indicate a decline in avercige capital flow magnitude,.
regardless of whether through outflow or inflow of funds.
11

~.
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U.S. inter','.entions of various types in Cuba over the years could have led
to Castro's reaction and the ultimate blow to U.S; business.activity in
(
I

Cuba. · There was no correspond.fog quick: in~rea·se of _investment in Taiwan
after the Quemoy-Matsu crisis (indicating that U.S. business leaders had
not yet flocked to the cheap labor pool), and data on investment in Jordan
and Lebanon were not available, so the investment picture after 1958 interventions remains cloudy ..
Data on investment ca·pital flows--the difference between capital sent
abroad by U.S. firms tci their foreign affiliates and capital ret~rned to
the U.S. by those affiliates--are more plentiful than those on.direct in-:
vestments, but represent an in.terpretative problem (see appendix for data
.

sources).

'

The difference between capital inflow· and outflow, and changes

in such difference river time do not reflect increas~d or decrea~ed absolute·
. investment.

Thus, capital flow data are used here only to illustrate
·orders of investment magnitude. 5.
•.

Business volume, as reflected by capit_al flows (Table 2b), seldom increased much after interventions, except perhap·~ for 1951 and 19q2.

Flows

to and from the Phiiippines increased sharply after the _intervention there
in 1951 (from $6 million in 1950 to $24 in 1957), and after the Thai and
Indian interventions of 1962 flows to those countries also increased somewhat.· Direct U.S. investment in the Phillipines also increased by $143
million between 1950 and 57, and in Jndia by $39 million: thus, ther~ is
scattered evidence of a correlation between intervention and business investments in Asia, but overa 11 there is not much difference between· the
effects of intervention and abstention.
Findings--Elitist Theory.

Testing the predictions derived from elite

theorists--that economic benefits from defens~ operations accrue to U.S.'

14
domestic industries-;..let us first ·examine the profit performance of defense
contractors and other U~ S. industries· during both interventions and non- .
intervention periods.

Later, we can move ·to examination of stock market

performance as well.
As noted above, Stevenson (1973) c6ncluded that defense c6ntractors
were comparatively profitable in both the late 1g5o•s and 60 1 s.

Profit-

ability data reported by Stigler and Friedland (1971) and- based on Pentagon
reports, s_how a slow general decline in the average rate of return on cap; ta l invested by defense business sectors· of top defense contractors as
compared to commercial business·sectors of these same companies and to the
FTC-SEC "universe" of 3500 companies.

However,· analysts have noted· that·

military contractors ·tend to systematically underreport their military
business profit levels (see Hunt and Sh~rman, 1975:471); ind Stevenson,
1973:249).
If we examine profit levels in relation to years of U.S. intervention.,
and·non-intervention, using Stigler and Friedland's data (Table 3), there
· (Table 3 about here)
are slight increases of defense business profitability in the early years
.

.

of the major Vi.etnam .intervention (1965-66), but these are dwarf~d by the
general business profit upswing from 1964-66.

Defense profitability was

as high in 1960-62 as during the peak-Vietnam years;

Furthermore, while,:

companies doing a high percentage of defense work had higher profits in
the 1950 1 s than other companies, no such distinction existed in the 60 1 s.
On the other hand, considering data on defense contractor profitability
c~llected by Stevenson (1973:252) ~hich do not_ distinguish between defense and commercial .operations of the same firms, average profits in the
1960 1 s reach a clear peak in. Vietnam years, 1965 and 1966.

However,

TABLE 3. AVERAGE RATES OF RETURN ON INVESTMENT FOR DEFENSE AND OTHER INDUSTRIES
DURING AND AFTER PERIODS OF MILITARY. INTERVENTION
'-.

Vear

1956-7
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
·1964
1965
1966
1967
1968 ·

Number of
Largest Defense Top 50% of · FTC-SEC . Fortune
U.S. InterContractors (l) Military
500
3500
ventions
Contractors Companies Co"mpanies
Begun·
Defense Commercial
(2)
(1)
(2)
-Business B~~iness
0
4
0
0
2
2
0
7
2
0
l

10.1 %
9.5%
8.7%
7.5%
7.4%
6.5%
'6.3%
7.6%
7.0%
7.3%
6.8%.

1~0%
"6.8%
4.8%
4. 7%
9.0% ·
8.7%
· 1o. 9%
11.6%
10.8%
7.4%
8.3%

-10.2% · ·
13. 4% .
12.8%
13. 5%
14.7%
14.9%
13.4%
13.0% ·

7.1%
. 9.3%
7.8%
7.4% · ·
9.3%
. 9.8%
10.8%
12.6%
l2A%
l O.1%
10.2%

Data de~iVed from Stigler and Friedland (1971:692~93) ·
with. perm·; ss ion.
.
.
.
(2) Data derived from Stevenson {1973:252)
with permi ss·i on.
(1)

,.

.--

..

8\.3%
8.9%
9 .1%
10.5%
·11.8% ·
12. 7%
11. 3%
11.7%
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profits of .the top 500 U.S. corporations des_ignated by Fortun~·Magazine
'

.

,

,

:

.

.

also peaked in those years;· thus the . economy asa whol~ had expanded,
and the increase in military contractors' profitability, which began in
1962, seemed mainly due to· cammerc:i a1 as opposed td defense work.

Certain

defense~dependent companies evidently profited dispioportionately from the
Vietnam war, however; . the avera~fe profit increase for the seven big aircraft contractors was twice as large as that.of the Fortune 500.

Also the

General Accounting Office has reported that large military c·ontractors had
significantly higher average mi 1itary than non:--mi 1itary profits.
and Sherman, 1975:471)

(Hunt

These firms' underreporting of profits means that

both the Stevenson and Stigler-Friedland data do not fully reflect defense
profits, but no better data are available to the p_ublic.

While Stevenson

(1973:252-57) concludes that the U.S. economy greatly depends on defense
spending, we should note that it is not clear that defense contractors
· greatly depend on military interventions.
Turning to analysis of defense and non-defense industries' New York
Stock ~xchange performance (Table 4), some of the clusters of interventions
(Table 4 about here)
seem to coihc~de with the largest gains for defense stocks.

Six interven-

tions occurred in the 1949-52 period, four occu.rr,ed in the 1958-59 period,
and nine came between late 1963 and 1965. These were periods of greatly
improved defense stock. performance, as well as some of the greatest Com.;.
parative gains of defense over non-defense stocks.· Thus, it evidently
takes more than one sma11 scale, or perhaps even one large scale intervention to kick the defense economy into high gear.

It may take simultaneous

and/or prolonged interventions in more than one country or more than one
region before capital investment patterns significantly change.

TABLE 4.

INCREASES OR DECREASES IN STOCK PERFORMANCE INDEX WITH U.S.
MILITARY INTERVENTIONS.
Change in AverQ.ge Stock Performa:nce from Same to FollO\•Jing
Fiscal Year.
·

Number of U.S.
Interventions
Per Year
0

1-2
4-7

All NYSE
Stocks
. 423(N=l0)
.299(N=7)
.755(N=3)

. .

Largest
Defense
Contractors,
1950-57
. . . . .
.
..
- .

.763(N=8)
.510(N=3)
1.968(N=2)

.

. .

Largest
Largest
· Defense
Defense
Contractors, Contractors,
1959 . . . . . . . . 1969
...
.

.

.261(N=4)
.·300(N=4)
. 310(N=2)

Source: Derived from Stigler and Friedland (1971}.

.

.

.367(N=4)
.457(N=4)
.446(N=2)

;
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Turnfng to analysis of defense and non-defense industries' New York
Stock Excha_nge performance, changes in Stigler & Friec;lland's (1973:693)
stock indices (first with June, 1948 set equal to 1000, and then, for defense industries-growing in the l960's, with June, 1958 set equal to 1000}
were calculated for the year following each year in th_e analysis.
.

Then

'

years were categorized as to whether zero; one or two, or four to seven
U.S. interventions took place, and· the average growth of defense and nondefense stocks was calculated (iable 4).6

Reg~rdless of whether.all NYSE

stocks are considered, or merely top defense contractors, there is a general tendency for increased performance after years with several U.S. interventions, but it is impossible to draw statistically valid conclusions·
from so few cases.

Notice, though, that the tendency for growth with

multiple interventions seems greater for the prime defense contractors of
the 1950's than for those of·the 1960 1 s.

Indeed a11 NYSE stocks grew

faster after years of. four to seven interventions than did the top defense
'

stocks of 1959 and 1969.

Defense stocks increased_ most during the periods:

1958-59 (four interventions); 1960-61 (no interventions in 1960, one in_
early 196-1); 1954~55 (one intervention in ·early 1955); 1965-66 (two major
interventions); and 1953-54 (no interventions).

Thus, while simultaneous

or prolonged interventions in more than one country or region may have led
to several spurts of defense stock investment, such spurts sometimes came
without intervention and followed periods of international crisiJ (such
as the lingering effects of Korean and Indochinese disputes).

Of course

no period since World War II has been totally free of crisis, and the
la_rgest decreases in defense stocks (1959-60, 1961-62, .1957-58} saw U.S.
cfisis involvement~ short of outright intervention in Berlin, the Bay of
Pjgs, and Syrian disputes.
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Three sets of factors may influence defense stock performance:
intense foreign crisis and repeated or prolonged interventions;

(1)

(2) the

force postures and doctrines adopted·and paid for by the Pentagon;

(3)

domestic economic factors influenci_ng · tradeoffs between civilian and defense capital investment.

There is some evidence in this study of the

importance of factors one and two; future economic analysis must also be
focused on factor three.
CONCLUSION
There is scattered evidence for both the neo-Leninist and elitist approaches~-evidence of increased business activity in some countries undergoing military intervention, and of Dow-Jones increases for U.S. defense industries during and following periods in which several interventions have
occurred.

U.S. businesses do not always shy away from combat theaters,

but generally do better during and after military interventions not involving U.S. combat.

However, there is no general trend indicating bus-

iness dependence on foreign interventions;

rather both business and the

armed forces may depend on military spending and force doctrines.
In Taiwan, India, Gabon, Laos, the Dominican Republic, and the
Philippines various types of business involvement increased after intervention.

However; in none of these countries were there simultaneous in-

creases of trade, investment, and strategic material supply.

Despite post-

intervention business gains in Asia and Africa, there was no statistical
correlation between intervention and business indicators for any region.
These findings fit Melvin Gurtov's characterization of U.S. interventionary policy as "imperial" rather than "imperialistic":

I

I

i

•
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because the latter would mean that American inter-

ventions have been motivated mainly by the need for
territory, bases, new markets, lines of communica.tion,
or co_rporate profits.

Instead, the motivation- has

generally been to preserve or e_xpand _dependency relation..;
ships with Third World societies by insuring access to,
,

.

and exerting predominant influence over, their policies,
economies , and mi 1i tary affairs. 11

(Gurtov, 1974: 202)

It appears that U.S. inter~entions co~ld have had the effect of perserving dependency relations, since intervention targets· were more depen- .·
dent on U.S. trade than non-targets both prior t0 and after interventions.
Interventions also brought increased dependency according to certain trade
indicators.

However, generally the· growth of trade was -in exports to,

rather than imports, fronr
the U.S. , and U.S. traders often increased de pen.
dency more on foreign goods and markets _than foreign states increased dependency.on U.S. goods.
While· prolonged interventions did not generally lead to greater overseas U.S._ business involvement, they, along with clusters of interventions,
seemed to lead to greater defense industry profits and stock performance.
Elite theorists would probably expect su_ch a finding, although they might
be surprised to learn that low combat, small scale interventions (e.g. the
Congo), and single cases of intervention did not greatly increase the vol~.
ume and profitability of defense-related business.

There is ample evi-

dence in the daily press and Congressional hearings of business influence
on U.S. defense policy, including the mach_inations of under-secretaries
· of Defense with strong defense business connections trying to hike arms
;.
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sales to countries like Iran.

Arms sales, however, seem in general more

profi~able than the less direct benefits of mi·litary intervention. '
Odell found little correlation between U.S. overseas business activity.
and subsequent intervention, 'and this ·study has reflected generally little
correlation between intervention and subsequent business activity.

Associ-

ations are strongest when we.consider increases or decreases in overseas
trade after interventions, and also the effect of prolonged military and
political intervention abroad on trade and profits.

However, there- is no

inyari-ant tendency for the fortunes of business to depend on the dispatch
of Marines.

;.

FOOTNOTES
1. While the U.S. was the dominant world military power in the post-

World W.ar. 11 era, it i~ p~obably untenable to assume tha't each world crisis
represented equally prooaol e sites for U.S. intervention. Therefore, to
distinguish among crises as to ease or opportunity of U.S. intervention,
cris~s within each region will be analyzed se~arately from other regions on
t~e ass~mption that if the U~~- intervenes in one ctisis in a ~egion it
could have intervened in any other: crisis in that r~gion during the same_
period.

Obviously, the occurrence of one intervention in a year may decrease

the likelihood of another, but we have tried to lessen this bias by choosing
the first incident of nonintervention in a given year if there were several
incidents in the same country.

However, we cannot assume that a11 cases of

intervention and non-intervention in -the study are total~y independent for
statistical purposes; Nevertheless, measures of association will be reported
in order to help identify the most important findings.
2. Note tha~ certain cases must be excluded from:analysis becau~e of
gaps in the overseas investment data due to the law restricting the U.S.
Commerce Department s disclosure of business operations.
1

3. We calculated the percentage ·of new supply of these commodities
(i.e., the sum of U.S. production and imports) comprised of imports and the ·
· percentage of total U.S. imports comprising exports from specific foreign
countries.

In this way the two major strategic commodities provided to the

U.S. during periods of intervention and non-intervention by each country in
the study were determined, and ch'anges in the s·upp ly of these were recorded
across the two years before and after interventfons and non-interventions.
4. The only trade variable not well explained by trade two years before crisis was_U.S. exports as a percentage of U.S. world.exports.
;.

How-

2

ever, intervention did not even account for one percent of the variance in
such exports ..
5. For example, in 1957 U.S. private capital outflow to Venezuela was
$826 million, and in 1966 the inflow from U.S. Venezuelan affiliates was
$47 million.

Disregarding the outflow vs. inflow distinction, the decline

of U.S. business volume in Venezuela between 1957 and 1966 is estimated at
$779 million (i.e., 826-47). The actual decline of total direct petroleum
and manufacturing investment in Venezuela, data which happen to be available through the Commerce Department, was $490 million.

So the capital

calculations at least seem to reflect the trend of general business volume.
Capital flow data were available only for 1950, 1957, and 1966, so all
interventions and noninterventions in 1950, 51, and 55 were fitted between
1950 and 1957, and those for 1958 and later were related to capital flow
scores for 1957 and 1966.
6. It seems reasonable to assume that interventions would affect stock
performance over the next fiscal year, since stock analysts indicate that
investors tend to react quickly to news.

Also, the data do not distinguish

between stock investments attracted by defense vs. commercial sectors of
top defense contractors.
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APPENDIX 1-A ·.
List of Interventions:
1.

Colombi a--April 11, 1948. USAF planes were dispatched to Colombia dur1

ing rioting to evacuate various U.S. nation~ls.l
2.

South Korea--June 27, 1950. Korean War.

3.

North Korea--June, 1950. Korean War.

4.

Republic of China (Taiwan)--June, ·1950.

During the Korean crisis, USAF

planes and USN ships
patrolled the Formosa Strait and Formosan waters.
..
\

5.

China (PRC)--August 27, 1950.

In October, a U.S. representative admit-

ted that U.S. bombers had fired on a PRC airfield by mistake in August.
6.

USSR--October 8, 1950. A U.S. spokesman said the·strafing of the Soviet
airfield south of Vladivostok by U.S. fighters was a mistake and expressed regret.

7. · Philippines~-October 25, 1951. · U.S. Marines left their base to help
Philippine troops search for 11 Huk 11 marauders.
8.

Republic of China (Taiwan)--January, 1955. During the Tachens crisis,
U.S. ships and planes patrolled the area and USN ships helped evacuate
Nationalist Chinese from the Tachens.

9i

Lebanon--July 15, 1958. Lebanese Civil War.

10. Jordari--July 17, 1958.

USAF planes overflew Jordan to provide air-

cover for the landing of U.K. paratroopers and later airlifted oil
to Jordan.
11. Cuba-.:.July 28, 1958. U.S. Marines left the Guantanamo base -to guard
the water pipeline but returned after Castro protested.

l. 11 Evacuations 11 have been included because several large-scale U.S. ·
intervention began with the excuse of 11 evacuation 11 •
"'

-.
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12.

Republic of China (Taiwan)-~September 4,' 1958.

During the Quemoy-Matsu

crisis, U.S. ships and planes patrolled the area and escorted
Nationalist Chinese convoys.
13.

Laos--March, 1961.

The U.S. began flying reconnaissance missions over

Laos and soon began airlifting arms and other supplies to the Laotian
Government.
14.

South Vietnam--December 11, 1961. Two U.~. helicopter companies arrived
in South Vietnam and began helping South Vietnamese forces in the
field.

15. Thailand;..-May 17, 1962. After SEATO maneuvers; 1000 U.S. troops were
ordered to remain in Thailand because of a Pathet Lao and Viet Minh
offensive in the northeastern border area.
16.

India--November, 1962.

During the Sino-Indian border conflict, the

U~S. sent.some military transport planes and crews to ferry supplies
and troops to border areas.
17. · Zanzibar--January 13, 1964.

After a c'oup; U.S. troops were dispatched

to help evacuate U.S. nationals to a waiting USN destroye~.
18.

Cambodia--March 19, 1964.

U.S. military forces began helping South

Vietnamese forces in attacks on Cambodian border villages.
·19.

Gabon--April, 1964. During a tense election in Gabon, a USAF plane.
landed (without Gabonese approval) in case it was necessary·to
evacuate'embassy personnel.

20.

Laos--May, 1964.

U.S. planes began bombing the Ho Chi Minh Trail in

Laos.
21.

North Vietnam--August 4,, 1964.
Gulf of Tonkin incident.

U.S. bombing began in response to the

3

22.

Congo (Kinshasa)--August 13, 1964. USAF transport planes were sent
to aid the Congolese Government and U.S. military personnel were
sent to maintain and g~ard the planes and t~ fly and gu~rd helicopters used in rescue and support missions.

23.

Congo (Kinshasa)--November 23, 1964. USAF, transport planes and crews
landed Belgian paratroopers to evacuate hostages held by Congolese
rebels.

24.

S. Vietnam--March 7, 1965.

U.S. troops undertook the bulk of fight-

ing in South Vietnam.
25.

Dominican Republic--April 28, 1965. Marine intervention.

26.

Congo {Kinshasa)--July 10, 1967.

During Congolese revolt, the U.S.

sent military transport planes and crews to provide long-range
logistical support.

APPENDIX 1-B

,.
..,

List of Non.:.. interventions·: l
1.

Yemen 1948

26. France 1951

51.

2.

Hyderabad 1948

27. Thailand 1951

52. Lebanon 1961

3.

India 1948

28.

Ecuado·r 1951

53.

Portugal 1961

4.

France 1948

29.

Panama 1951

54.

Nepal 1961

5.

Indonesia 1948 -

30.

Peru 1951

55.

Ecuador 1961

6.

Malaya 1948

31.

Israel 1955

56.

Ethiopia .1961

7.

Pakistan 1948

32.

Egypt 1955 -

57. Turkey 1962

8.

Brazil 1948

33. Muscat-Oman 1955

. 9.

Costa Rica 1948

34 . Tunisia 1955

El Salvador 1948

35.

10~

...

Yemen 1955

11. Ghana 1948

36. -India 1955

12. Somalia 1948

37.

Portugal 1955

13.

Ivory Coast 1950

38-. · Indonesia 1955

14.

India 1950

39. _ Sudan 1955

15. - Pakistan 1950

40. Argentina 1955

16.

Indonesia 1950

41_.

17.

Nepal 1950

42. .Cameroon 1955

Panama 1955

18. Tibet 1950

43.

Sierra Leone 1955

19. Bolivia 1950

44.

Iraq 1958-

20.

Venezuela 1950

45.

Morocco 1958

21.

Egypt 1951

46.

Ceylon 1958

22..

Iran 1951

47.

India 1958

23.

Israel 1951

48.

Pakistan 1958

24.

Syria 1951

49.

Argentina 1958

25.

Morocco 1951

50.

Venezuela 1958

. 58.

Iraq 1961

South Arabian
· Sult~nates 1962 · ·

59. Algeria 1962
60.

Israel 1962- ·

61. Syria 1962
62.

Yemen 1962

. .

63. Malaya 1962
64. Argentina 1962
65.

Peru 1962

66 . Venezuela 1962
67.

Brunei· 1962

68.

Ghana 1962

69.

Zambia 1962

70; Malawi 1962
71.

Senegal 1962

72.

South Africa 1962

73.

Israel 1964

74.

Syria 1964 -

75 • Ethiopia 1964

!

l
2

.
'r

76.

Sudan 1964

84.

Niger 1964

92.

Indonesia 1965

77.

Pakistan 1964

85.

Tanganyika 1964

93.

78.

Malaya 1964

86.

Uganda 1964

Central African
Re pub 1i c 19.65

79.

Argentina 1964

87.

Zambia 1964

94.

Chad 1965

80.

Bolivia 1964

88. Algeria 1965

81.

Somalia 1964

89.

Ethiopia 1965

82.

Kenya 1964

90.

India

83.

Portugal 1964

91.

Pakistan 1965

l.

i

95.

Dahomey 1965

96.

Malawi 1965

97.

Rhodesia 1965

Data on non-interventions were originally collected by Richard Cady

and William Prince (Cady and Prince, 1974) who identified 323 post-World
War II conflicts, and coded the level of U.S., U.S.S.R., and P.R.C. involvement in the conflicts on a scale from zero ( uninvolved
11

11

)

to seven

("combat operations or large scaleemployment of combatant force in conflict situations

11
).

To utilize these data, a subset composed of conflicts

in which the U.S. had remained uninvolved
11

11

was assembled and these con-

flicts were then assigned to the country or countries which had been involved in the dispute.

For example, conflict #320 ("Ethiopia-Somalian

Border Dispute") was assigned to both Ethiopia and Somalia, and thus became two country-conflicts.

After dropping several cases from the study

because they did not occur during the time period covered. by this study,
and dropping all but the first incident of non-intervention in a given
country in a given year, the non-intervention data set was composed of
97 country-conflicts.
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